Interception accounted for 18.30 percent of the signaling attacks one spy group pushed through Asian mobile networks. A commercial surveillance vendor, measured the same way by the same researchers, spends 2.07 percent of its traffic on interception and burns the rest on finding out where people are standing.
The group is called SilentAir, and Enea, the Swedish signaling-security vendor whose firewalls sit inside carrier networks, published the tracking report this month. Enea assesses with high confidence that SilentAir is a state-level actor and only with low confidence that it is China-nexus. Compromised SS7 and Diameter nodes turned up inside operators in at least six Asian countries, targets were spread across a dozen more with Taiwan first among them, and single bursts reached several thousand subscribers in a month. The detail that matters to anyone running a Microsoft 365 tenant is one line in the attack breakdown: after a diversion, Enea watched two-factor codes arrive at the attacker-controlled node.
Microsoft has already put dates on the other end of this. Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication retires in Microsoft Entra ID on February 1, 2027 for every user except Global Administrators and external users, and on July 1, 2027 for those two groups. Internal guest accounts stay on the February date. After the applicable date, a user whose only available method is SMS or voice gets a blocking passkey registration prompt and cannot finish signing in until they complete it. Microsoft states plainly that there is no opt out from enforcement.
Who has to act, and who can close the tab
If you run an Entra ID tenant in the public cloud, including GCC, and anyone in it is enabled for SMS or voice in the authentication methods policy or in the legacy per-user MFA settings, you have a dated piece of work. Azure AD B2C is out of scope and unaffected. Microsoft Entra External ID gets a separate announcement next year. Other sovereign clouds follow a later schedule.
If nobody in your tenant has a phone method registered, run the inventory in the next section once, confirm the zero, and spend your week on something else. That is a real outcome and it is worth ten minutes to establish.
If you are not on Entra at all, there is no Microsoft deadline on your calendar, but the Enea finding does not care which identity provider you bought. It applies to every one-time code you accept over SMS or a voice call, including the codes your own application sends customers and the ones guarding your business banking.
What the signaling plane does to a one-time code
The mechanism needs no malware on the handset, no SIM swap at a retail counter, and no phishing page. SS7 UpdateLocation, or its Diameter equivalent Update-Location-Request, tells a subscriber's home network that the phone is now being served by a different node. If the home network accepts the claim, future calls and texts route to whoever sent it. Enea's breakdown puts location tracking at 0.22 percent of SilentAir's traffic, close to the inverse of how a surveillance contractor spends its time.
Two details separate this from the SS7 research that has circulated for a decade. First, Enea observed network elements inside an operator both sending and receiving attack commands, which confirms the equipment itself was taken over rather than its addresses being faked, and that defeats filtering built on where traffic appears to come from. Second, SilentAir sent silent SMS at scale, mostly overnight and mostly to Taiwanese subscribers, apparently to confirm that an existing diversion was still live. Activity followed a UTC+8 working day and dropped off on weekends and Chinese holidays. Enea has watched the bursts since early 2025, separated by months of silence.
Singapore's regulator published its own advisory on the related implant, a Linux kernel trojan that injects SS7 and Diameter traffic over existing SCTP connections and that CrowdStrike tracks as SIGweaver. Enea notes SilentAir handles transactions it never initiated, which that implant cannot do, so part of the tooling is still unidentified.
CISA reached the operational conclusion two years ago and wrote it in a single imperative in its Mobile Communications Best Practice Guidance: "Do not use SMS as a second factor for authentication. SMS messages are not encrypted - a threat actor with access to a telecommunication provider's network who intercepts these messages can read them." Enea's report is what that sentence looks like running in production against real subscribers.
Find the users who have nothing else
Microsoft ships an SMS and voice usage analyzer and treats any non-zero result as proof you are in scope. Run it. Then run your own pass, because the count that decides your January is not how many users have a phone registered. It is how many have a phone and nothing else, since those are the only accounts that hit the blocking prompt.
Global Reader, Authentication Policy Administrator, or Security Reader is enough for both:
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'AuditLog.Read.All','UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All' -NoWelcome
$uri = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/reports/authenticationMethods/userRegistrationDetails?$top=999'
$rows = @()
do {
$page = Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method GET -Uri $uri
$rows += $page.value
$uri = $page.'@odata.nextLink'
} while ($uri)
$phone = @('mobilePhone','alternateMobilePhone','officePhone')
$strong = @('passKeyDeviceBound','passKeyDeviceBoundAuthenticator',
'passKeyDeviceBoundWindowsHello','windowsHelloForBusiness','fido2SecurityKey')
$rows | ForEach-Object {
$m = @($_.methodsRegistered)
[pscustomobject]@{
User = $_.userPrincipalName
IsAdmin = $_.isAdmin
HasPhone = @($m | Where-Object { $phone -contains $_ }).Count -gt 0
PhishResistant = @($m | Where-Object { $strong -contains $_ }).Count -gt 0
PhoneOnly = @($m).Count -gt 0 -and @($m | Where-Object { $phone -notcontains $_ }).Count -eq 0
Methods = ($m -join ',')
}
} | Where-Object HasPhone |
Sort-Object PhoneOnly, IsAdmin -Descending |
Export-Csv .\entra-phone-method-exposure.csv -NoTypeInformation
Read three columns. PhoneOnly is the February 1 blocking population. IsAdmin buys until July 1, and those accounts should move first regardless of what their deadline says. PhishResistant is the number you are trying to grow, and it is the only one a Conditional Access policy can enforce on.
Registration tells you what a user could use. Sign-in logs tell you what they actually reach for, which is the number that predicts help-desk volume in February. If you ship sign-in logs to a Log Analytics workspace:
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where ResultType == 0
| mv-expand todynamic(AuthenticationDetails)
| extend method = tostring(AuthenticationDetails.authenticationMethod)
| where method in ("SMS", "Text message", "Voice call",
"Phone call approval", "Mobile phone call")
| summarize signins = count(),
apps = dcount(AppDisplayName),
lastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by UserPrincipalName, method
| order by signins desc
No workspace is not a blocker. The Authentication methods activity report in the Entra admin center carries the registration and usage counts without one.
Four replacements, and what each is actually worth
Microsoft's position is that passkeys become the default and everything else is an exception you justify. Know what each path costs before you assign one to a population.
Passkeys, synced or device-bound
Cryptographic key pairs instead of a shared secret, resistant to phishing, SIM swap, and replay. Synced passkeys live in a platform credential manager such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager. Device-bound passkeys include Passkey in Microsoft Authenticator, Entra Passkey on Windows, and FIDO2 hardware keys. They satisfy a Conditional Access phishing-resistant authentication strength, and Microsoft confirms that migrating SMS and voice users to passkeys carries no additional cost. This is the default answer for anyone with a company-managed device or a current smartphone.
FIDO2 security keys
The same cryptographic guarantee in a form that does not assume a personal phone. Keys cost real money per user and need an enrollment process that proves who is holding them, so reserve them for the populations where a phone will not work: shared workstations, clinical and warehouse floors, contractors, and the administrator tier.
TOTP codes from an authenticator app
Microsoft confirms TOTP remains supported for new and existing registrations after February 1, 2027, that it does not depend on SMS delivery, and that users on TOTP do not receive the blocking passkey prompt. It is also not phishing-resistant and will not satisfy a Conditional Access policy that requires phishing-resistant authentication. CISA's framing is the one to keep: authenticator codes beat SMS, and only FIDO authentication is phishing-resistant. Treat TOTP as the stopgap that guarantees nobody is locked out in February, not as the destination.
A telephony provider through Microsoft Security Store
If a regulator or a contract names SMS specifically, you can keep the channel by contracting a provider directly. Soprano and Telesign are the initial options in private preview, configuration opened on October 30, 2026, and pricing varies by provider, region, and volume. You are buying a carrier relationship, and the thing you are buying is the delivery path Enea just documented being diverted. Write down which regulation requires it before you sign.
Decide self-service password reset at the same time, because the retirement applies across Entra and SSPR is included. Passkeys on their own do not satisfy SSPR requirements, so a tenant that moves everyone to passkeys and stops there has quietly removed its own password-recovery path. For a company of sixty people this whole exercise is an afternoon of policy work and a box of security keys for the admins, scheduled well before the deadline rather than during it.
Registering a passkey does not remove the phone number
This is where tenants will get caught, and CISA named the trap in the same guidance: "Enrollment in authenticator-based MFA does not automatically unenroll the account's SMS. This can create a weak, exploitable fallback mechanism that can be exploited by threat actors." Entra behaves exactly that way. A user who registers a passkey on Monday still has SMS available on Tuesday until you take them out of the SMS and Voice Calls scope in the authentication methods policy, and they will keep getting registration nudges while they remain in it.
Check both policy surfaces, because the legacy per-user MFA service settings can keep phone methods alive for a user even when the modern policy shows them off:
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes 'Policy.Read.All' -NoWelcome
$amp = Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method GET `
-Uri 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/authenticationMethodsPolicy'
$amp.authenticationMethodConfigurations |
Where-Object { $_.id -in @('Sms','Voice','Fido2','MicrosoftAuthenticator','SoftwareOath') } |
ForEach-Object {
[pscustomobject]@{
Method = $_.id
State = $_.state
Targets = (($_.includeTargets | ForEach-Object { $_.id }) -join ',')
}
} | Format-Table -AutoSize
Microsoft does offer a temporary escape from the September 2026 automatic passkey enablement and the registration campaign, through the passkeyDynamicMigration opt-out on the authentication methods policy. It buys quiet, not time: the opt-out window closes on February 1, 2027 and enforcement applies to every tenant regardless. A team that uses it without also running the migration has bought itself a worse February.
On deadline-driven identity migrations the sequence decides the outcome: inventory, then enroll, then remove. Remove first and you generate lockouts and a help-desk queue that stalls the rollout. Enroll and never remove and the weak path is still standing when somebody reviews an incident.
Take the phone number out of the policy, not just off the user
Three things this week. Run the registration export above and get the PhoneOnly count, because that single number tells you whether February 1 is an afternoon or a project. Enable passkeys and point a registration campaign at the users that export names, starting with administrators, who get a later deadline and deserve an earlier fix. Then put a calendar entry in mid-January to remove those users from the SMS and Voice Calls scope, so the fallback that Enea watched being intercepted is gone from your tenant before Microsoft takes it away. We work with small teams on exactly this sequence, including the populations where a passkey will not fit and somebody has to decide what goes there instead.
Need help hardening your identity infrastructure?
We assess Active Directory and Entra ID environments for the misconfigurations attackers actually exploit, including the authentication methods still enabled behind a policy that looks clean. Book a session to discuss your environment.
